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Abstract 
 
The long-run abnormal returns following both stock repurchases and seasoned equity offerings 
disappear for the events in the most recent decade. The disappearance is associated with the changing 
market environment – increased institutional investment, decreased trading costs, improved liquidity, 
and enhanced regulations on corporate governance and information disclosure. In response to the 
changing market environment, firms become less opportunistic in stock repurchases and offerings. 
Recent events are motivated more for business operating reasons than to exploit mispricing. Both 
external market factors and internal firm factors contribute to the disappearance of the post-event 
abnormal returns. Our evidence on the recent events contrasts with the findings of earlier studies and 
sheds light on how the changing market environment affect both asset pricing and corporate behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous studies document that long-run stock returns are abnormally high following stock 
repurchases and abnormally low following stock offerings.
1
 Although in principle these findings 
critically depend on the specification of “normal” returns, they appear fairly robust to various 
benchmark models of expected returns.
2
 The findings are often interpreted to imply event stock 
mispricing and event firms’ opportunistic market timing. 3  In this study we show that firms 
repurchasing or issuing stocks in the past decade do not incur post-event long-run abnormal returns. 
The disappearance of long-run abnormal performance is related to the changing market environment – 
more sophisticated investors, lower trading cost, better liquidity, and more transparent and credible 
information disclosure. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 strengthens corporate 
governance. As a result, event firms in the past decade appear to abstain from manipulating earnings 
and information disclosure prior to the announcement, both of which are shown in earlier studies to be 
associated with the long-run abnormal returns. Further evidence suggests that recent events are 
conducted more for business operating reasons than for market timing, in particular, repurchases to 
pay out cash and SEOs to invest and improve profitability. Both the external market environment and 
the internal firm factors contribute to the disappearance of abnormal returns following these two 
events.  
Our sample contains 14,309 open-market stock repurchases in 1984-2012 and 6,739 seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs) in 1980-2012. Previous studies that document long-run abnormal performance 
examine the events prior to 2002. For example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) 
examine repurchases in 1980-1990, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) examine repurchases in 1991-2001, 
and Ritter (2003) studies SEOs in 1970-2000. We confirm their results for the events up to 2002 that 
long-run abnormal returns are significantly positive following repurchases and significantly negative 
following SEOs.
 
For the events after 2002, in sharp contrast, we find neither outperformance following 
repurchases nor underperformance following SEOs. The contrasting results between the early and later 
periods are robust to various estimation methods of long-run abnormal returns and are not explained 
by the “bad model” problem since we employ the same set of models for the two time periods. The 
2003-2012 sample is not small in size; it contains 4,652 stock repurchases (33% of the total sample) 
                                                          
1
 See Ritter (1991) for early documentation of negative long-run abnormal returns following IPOs, Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) for early documentation of negative long-run abnormal 
returns following seasoned equity offerings, and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) for early 
documentation of positive long-run abnormal returns following stock repurchases. 
2
 See Fama (1998) for discussion of the “bad model” problem, which focuses on measurement of expected 
returns. See Ritter (2003) for evidence on SEO abnormal returns and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) for evidence 
on repurchase abnormal returns robust to different measurement and model specifications.  
3
 There are also rational explanations for corporate stock transactions. Both the q-theory of investment and the 
real option theory imply lower expected returns for post-SEO stocks (Li, Livdan, and Zhang, 2009; Liu, Whited, 
and Zhang, 2009; Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2006). Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) develop a model to 
show that stochastic financing condition affects corporate repurchase and SEO decisions and the resulted cash 
position affects the firm’s cost of capital. 
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and 1,826 SEOs (27% of the total sample).
4
 Further tests invalidate lack of statistical power as a 
potential explanation for the disappearance of abnormal performance. Our results are also robust to 
excluding events or event returns during the period of 2008 financial crisis and to including the 
investment factor (Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang, 2008) or the investor sentiment index (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006) into the Fama-French three factor model. Moreover, we find that the negative cross-
sectional relation between net equity issuance and subsequent returns, documented in Daniel and 
Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008), significantly weakens, or even disappears in some 
specifications, in the sample of the most recent decade. 
The disappearance of long-run abnormal returns seems to be related to the changing market 
environment. Over the past decade, the stock market overall has experienced an unprecedented 
increase in institutional investment. Hedge funds proliferate and actively seek profitable opportunities. 
Trading costs decline and liquidity substantially improves, as a result of the decimalization in 2001 
and the explosion of algorithm trading in the last decade.
5
 Furthermore, regulations about information 
disclosure and corporate governance in the early 2000s, brought by the Regulation Fair Disclosure and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in particular, have enhanced the transparency and credibility of corporate 
information to the market.
6
 In other words, the stock market in the past decade features an increasing 
number of sophisticated arbitrageurs and a more favorable environment for arbitrage activities. In a 
recent study, Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2011) show that there has been an explosive increase 
in institutional trading, information is more effectively incorporated into stock prices, and stock prices 
conform more to random walks. They explicitly argue that the stock market has generally become 
more efficient in recent years. 
We investigate if the new market environment facilitates pricing efficiency of our event stocks. In 
particular, we examine intertemporal changes in several pricing efficiency variables of event firms and 
the impact of these variables on the disappearing long-run abnormal returns. They are institution 
ownership, hedge fund ownership, liquidity, analyst coverage, and return variance ratio. Institutional 
investors are known to improve stock pricing efficiency.
7
 Hedge funds are more effective in 
eliminating mispricing than other institutional investors, due to their larger flexibility in using 
derivatives and short-selling (Stulz, 2007). Liquidity lowers costs of arbitrage. Financial analysts 
                                                          
4
 Some of the early studies that first document abnormal performance were based on event samples of similar or 
even smaller size. For example, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) examine 1,247 SEOs in 1975-1989, 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) examine 1,239 repurchases in 1980-1990, Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) examine 3,481 repurchases in 1991-2001.  
5
 See Bessembinder (2003), Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2005; 2011), French (2008), among others, for 
the reduction in trading costs and improvement in liquidity. See Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), 
Brogaard, Hendershott, Riordan (2014), and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2013) for the implications of algorithm 
trading on liquidity and pricing. 
6
 See Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003), Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2004), Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys (2008), and Zolotoy (2008), among others. 
7
 See, Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995), Sias and Starks (1997), Nagel (2003), Boehmer and Kelley (2009), and 
Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2011), among others. 
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facilitate speedy information incorporation into stock prices. The ratio of return variance during 
trading hours to that in non-trading hours, first proposed by French and Roll (1986), measures how 
effectively the market incorporates information into stock prices.  
We show that both institution ownership and hedge fund ownership of event stocks have been 
increasing over time – and more rapidly over the past decade. Since 2002 institutions persistently own 
over 50% of the event stocks. Event stocks held more by institutions, especially hedge funds, incur 
less significant abnormal returns. Similarly, we observe substantial increases in analyst coverage, 
liquidity, and variance ratio of event stocks from the early to the later periods. The long-run abnormal 
returns are significantly mitigated or even absent for event stocks that are followed by more analysts, 
are more liquid, or have higher variance ratios. The negative relations between these factors and long-
run abnormal returns still hold after controlling for various event firm characteristics. The findings 
lend strong support to the impact of the market environment changes on the disappearance of long-run 
abnormal returns.  
In addition to the external market environment, internal factors such as event firm motivation and 
behavior could also affect the post-event abnormal returns. Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Gong, 
Louis, and Sun (2008), respectively, show that firms manage earnings upward before SEOs and 
downward before repurchases through discretionary accounting accruals. Such manipulations are 
further shown to mislead investors and be responsible for the post-event long-run abnormal returns. To 
strengthen corporate governance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 promulgates the independence and 
oversight of audit committee and thus renders earnings manipulation under tighter scrutiny (Cohen, 
Dey, and Lys, 2008). We find that, in contrast to the earlier event firms, both repurchase and SEO 
firms after 2002 refrain from earnings management. In addition, recent repurchase firms are less 
involved in manipulations of information disclose prior to the event, which are found in the earlier 
repurchases to lower firms’ repurchasing prices (Brockman, Khurana, and Martin, 2008). The 
reduction of such opportunistic behavior in the past decade helps to mitigate stock mispricing before 
the event and long-run abnormal returns after the event.  
Managers learn and respond to the information from financial markets in making corporate 
decisions.
8
 If mispricing motivates corporate market timing through stock repurchases and offerings, 
the recent changes in market environment and the improvement in stock pricing efficiency should 
dampen such incentives. More efficient pricing gives rise to fewer market-timing opportunities since 
mispricing is less likely to occur in the first place and, even if it still occurs, more effective arbitrage 
would make mispricing hard to persist. We therefore expect that fewer of the recent (occurred) events 
than before are motivated to time the market. Consistent with this prediction, we find that both 
                                                          
8
 See, for example, Luo (2005), Chen, Goldstein, Jiang (2012), Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012), Bond, 
Edmans, and Goldstein (2013), for the effect of financial market on corporate decisions. 
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repurchase and SEO firms in recent years exhibit less of the characteristics that earlier studies interpret 
as evidence of market timers. Specifically, compared with the earlier event firms, recent repurchase 
(SEO) firms have significantly lower (higher) book-to-market ratios and higher (lower) run-up returns 
before the announcement. In logit regressions of whether or not a firm conducts a repurchase or an 
SEO, the variables that are supposed to explain the decisions under the market-timing hypothesis have 
significantly weaker (or completely lose) explanatory power in the later sample. Our further 
examinations of analyst investment recommendations, insider trading around event announcements 
and the issuance of secondary shares in SEOs also suggest that market timing has become less likely 
the driving force behind recent stock repurchases and offerings.  
Less motivated by mispricing and market timing, recent repurchases are more like a regular tool 
for mature and profitable firms to pay out cash and recent SEOs are motivated by more productive 
uses of the proceeds. Repurchases dominate dividends in corporate payout during recent years after 
increases in both frequency and dollar magnitude. Firms with certain characteristics that used to pay 
dividends switch to frequent repurchases in cash payout. Loughran and Ritter (1997) find a significant 
deterioration in operating performance after the earlier SEOs and interpret the evidence as a support 
for the market timing hypothesis. In contrast, we find that recent SEO firms experience a significant 
improvement in operating performance. Compared with the earlier SEO firms, recent issuers invest 
more (in capital expenditure) and save less (in cash balance) of the SEO proceeds. The changes in 
event motivations and decisions as a response to the changing market environment are consistent with 
the feedback effect of financial markets. Our examination on financing decisions complements earlier 
studies that examine corporate investment and acquisition decisions (Luo 2005; Chen, Goldstein, 
Jiang, 2012; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012). 
To summarize, we find that the formerly robust long-run abnormal returns following stock 
repurchases and SEOs disappear in the recent data. The disappearance is associated with external 
market factors – the improvement in pricing efficiency and the enhanced regulations about corporate 
governance and information disclosure. Firms respond to the changing market and become less 
opportunistic in recent stock repurchases and SEOs – refraining from manipulating earnings and 
information disclosure prior to the events and from conducting the events primarily for market timing. 
Recent repurchases and SEOs are motivated more for business operating reasons than for exploiting 
mispricing. Therefore, both external market factors and internal firm factors help to understand the 
disappearance of the post-event long-run abnormal returns. Influenced by technology advance, 
regulation policies, investment knowledge, etc., investors, corporations, and the market interact and 
evolve over time. This dynamic interaction and evolvement exert important impact on asset pricing as 
well as corporate decisions.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on the persistence of stock market anomalies. In his 
survey article, Schwert (2003) points out, “After they are documented and analyzed in the academic 
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literature, anomalies often seem to disappear, reverse, or attenuate. …many of the well-known 
anomalies in the finance literature do not hold up in different sample periods.” (p. 939).  He presents 
empirical evidence to illustrate that the size, value, weekend, dividend-yield, and small-firm turn-of-
the-year effects are such disappearing anomalies. He further suggests that “the activities of 
practitioners who implement strategies to take advantage of anomalous behavior can cause the 
anomalies to disappear”. In a contemporaneous study, McLean and Pontiff (2013) investigate the 
cross-sectional return predictability of 82 characteristics that are identified in prior academic studies, 
and find an average decline of 35% in return predictability after the publication of these studies. One 
driving force for the decline is sophisticated investors trading against the anomalies after they are 
known. In another recent study, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014) examine a large set of 
cross-sectional return anomalies and find that the return predictability has decreased, both statistically 
and economically, or even disappeared in recent years. They attribute the attenuation of anomalies to 
increased liquidity and arbitrage activity. Our study on the persistence of long-run abnormal returns 
sheds similar light on the role of institutional investors and liquidity. Moreover, our investigation 
reveals that changes in corporate behavior could also play an important role in the disappearance of 
certain anomalies. We are the first to propose this in the literature of anomaly persistence.   
2. The Sample of Stock Repurchases and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
We obtain the sample of stock repurchases and SEOs from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
U.S. database. The sample firms are required to have monthly stock returns in CRSP. Our repurchase 
sample contains 14,309 open-market repurchases of common stocks announced from January 1984 to 
December 2012.
9
 If a firm makes multiple announcements within a year, only the first one is selected. 
Our SEO sample consists of 6,739 common stock issues by industrial firms between January 1980 and 
December 2012. Pure secondary offerings by existing shareholders are excluded. We require the size 
of announced repurchase and new stock issues to be at least 1% of the event firm’s existing market 
capitalization.  
We estimate and compare abnormal returns following these two events in 2003-2012 with those 
in the early years. For convenience, we refer to the sample up to 2002 as “the early sample” and the 
sample after 2002 as “the later sample”. We select 2002 as the cut point because most prior studies 
documenting long-run abnormal returns examine the data of repurchases and SEOs prior to 2002. For 
example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) examine 1,247 open-market repurchases in 
1980-1990, and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) examine 3,481 repurchases in the subsequent decade 
1991-2001. Ritter (2003) examine 7,760 SEOs in 1970-2000. Our examination for the post-2002 data 
thus provides a meaningful out-of-sample test. Moreover, there are a number of regulatory changes 
concentrated in the period 2000-2003, including the enforcement of Reg FD in late 2000, the 
                                                          
9
 Open-market repurchases were relatively rare until the SEC adopted the safe harbor Rule 10b-18 in 1982. The 
SDC starts to have comprehensive data on
 
share repurchases only since 1984. 
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decimalization of stock prices in 2001, and the enactment of SOX in early 2002. These regulatory 
changes have significant impact on SEO and repurchase firms, which we will elaborate in Section 4 
and 5. This makes 2003 a natural starting point for the later sample. Nevertheless, our key results are 
not sensitive to the choice of using 2001 or 2003 as the alternative cut point.  
3. Empirical Results of Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
The estimation of long-run abnormal returns has been controversial. Various estimation methods 
have been offered in the literature and each has its pros and cons.
10
 Given the lack of consensus on the 
best method, we employ three widely-used but drastically different methods to estimate long-run 
abnormal returns: (1) the calendar-time portfolio approach (as proposed in Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000), (2) Ibbotson’s (1975) returns across time and securities (IRATS), and (3) the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHAR) relative to control firms matched on size, book-to-market equity ratio, and 
return momentum (as illustrated in Barber, Lyon, and Tsai, 1999).
11
  
Table 1 reports the 36-month abnormal return results, respectively for the full sample, and the 
early and later subsamples.
12
 In the full sample, we confirm the findings of prior studies that the three-
year abnormal stock returns are significantly positive following share repurchases and significantly 
negative following SEOs. All three estimation methods yield consistent results. For the calendar-time 
portfolio approach, we compute both equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns and run the test 
separately. The magnitude of the estimated abnormal returns is also comparable across different 
methods. Generally, in the three years following the announcement, repurchase firms on average 
realize about 5%-10% positive returns and SEO firms incur about 13%-20% negative returns relative 
to the expected return benchmarks.  
However, a closer examination shows that the long-run abnormal returns are consistently 
significant only in the early sample.
13
 In the 2003-2012 sample of events, we find no significant 
outperformance following repurchases under all three methods of abnormal return estimation. The 
abnormal return estimated under IRATS even turns significantly negative. The underperformance 
following SEOs also disappears if abnormal returns are estimated under the two calendar-time 
approaches (based on equal- and value-weighted portfolio returns, respectively) or using the control-
firm matched BHAR. The abnormal return estimated under IRATS is still significant at the 5% level 
but the magnitude reduces from -20% in the early sample to -6% in the later sample. Our out-of-
                                                          
10
 See Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998), Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), among others. 
11
 The details of these empirical methods are described in the Appendix. 
12
 We examine abnormal returns over the holding periods of 24, 36, and 48 months. Overall, the main results are 
consistent across different holding periods. For the sake of brevity, we only report the results for the holding 
period of 36 months.  
13
 According to Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the calendar-time approach using value-weighted portfolio return 
is the least likely to detect abnormal returns. Using this method, we still find statistically significant 
outperformance following repurchases and underperformance following SEOs for the early sample. 
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sample estimation results are in sharp contrast to the earlier findings and thus cast serious doubt on the 
persistence of long-run abnormal returns.
14
  
3.1. Is the Disappearance of Abnormal Returns Due to Statistical Power? 
Since standard errors used to evaluate the statistical significance of abnormal returns generally 
increase with a shorter time series of data, there arises a concern that the lack of significance in the 
later sample might be due to the lack of statistical power for the shortened sample period. The time 
frame for our 2003-2012 sample is perhaps not long, but it is not short either; it includes 10 years out 
of a total of 29 years for repurchases and a total of 33 years for SEOs. In terms of the number of 
observations, the later sample consists of 4,652 repurchases (32.5% of the total repurchase sample) 
and 1,826 SEOs (27.1% of the total SEO sample). Nevertheless, we conduct two additional checks to 
address this concern.  
First, we randomly pick 10 years in the early sample period and estimate the abnormal returns for 
these shortened subsamples. We do this for multiple times. In almost every time, we confirm the 
significance of the abnormal performance for both events in these early subsamples. In fact, earlier 
studies that first document the abnormal performance do not have very long time-series event data. 
Second, we compare the standard errors for the abnormal returns across the early and later periods. 
While the standard errors for SEOs are slightly higher in the later period (0.201 vs. 0.229 under the 
calendar-time value-weighted portfolio approach), those for repurchases are quite similar for both 
periods (0.094 vs. 0.108). More importantly, we do observe a significant reduction in the magnitude of 
abnormal returns, which are not affected by standard errors. Overall, the evidence does not support 
lack of statistical power as a potential explanation for the absence of abnormal performance in the 
post-2002 sample.  
Our later sample period covers the 2008 financial crisis, which is known to have extremely high 
volatilities and low returns. To investigate if our results are driven by this “abnormal” crisis period, we 
conduct two robustness checks for the later sample. We use CBOE VIX to identify 09/2008 to 
06/2009 as the crisis period.
15
 First, we exclude from our estimation the 307 repurchase and 123 SEO 
events announced during this crisis period. The monthly alpha estimated under the calendar-time 
equal-weighted portfolio approach is 0.13% (t-stat = 1.18) for repurchases and -0.32% (t-stat = -1.26) 
for SEOs; neither is significant. Second, we exclude event stock returns during this period. The 
monthly alpha estimated under the calendar-time equal-weighted portfolio approach is 0.13% (t-stat = 
                                                          
14
 Using IRATS and the calendar time portfolio approach, Obernberger (2013) also shows in his working paper 
that the long-run abnormal returns following stock repurchases do not exist in the sample of 2004-2010. In Jay 
Ritter’s recent update of Loughran and Ritter (1995), available on his website, he also shows that the post-SEO 
long-run abnormal returns attenuate substantially in the 2001-2011 sample.  
15
 The average daily CBOE VIX, the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options, is 16 for the period 01/2004 – 
08/2007 while it is as high as 45 during 09/2008 – 06/2009. It returns to 20 during 07/2009 – 12/2013. The VIX 
is over 30 in most of the days during 09/2008 – 06/2009 which is very unusual in other periods. Moreover, the 
value-weighted CRSP market return is -26.7% during this period.  
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1.59) and -0.33% (t-stat = 2.03) for the two filtered later samples, respectively. If value-weighted 
portfolio returns are used in estimation, none of the alphas is significantly different from zero. Similar 
results are obtained using the other two estimation methods. We therefore conclude that the 
disappearance of abnormal returns is not due to the financial crisis.  
3.2. Do Investment or Investor Sentiment Explain the Disappearance of Abnormal Returns? 
There are rational explanations, especially for the poor return performance following SEOs. Both 
the q-theory of investment and the real options theory imply a negative relation between investment 
and expected returns. In the q-theory, firms invest more when their marginal q is higher. Controlling 
for expected cash flows, a higher marginal q is associated with a lower cost of capital. This point is 
developed in Li, Livdan, and Zhang (2009) and Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009) to explain poor returns 
following SEOs. In their real options model, Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2006) argue that 
growth options are riskier than assets in place. Corporate investment transforms riskier growth options 
into less risky assets in place, thereby reducing risk and expected returns. Motivated by these theories, 
Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008) construct an investment factor, long in low-investment stocks and 
short in high-investment stocks, and find that adding this factor into standard factor regressions 
significantly reduces the abnormal returns following SEOs. 
  Following Lyandres, et al. (2008), we construct the investment factor and augment the Fama-
French three factors with it in the calendar time approach. The average three-year abnormal return 
following SEOs of the early sample indeed reduces from -16.20% to -10.51%, using value-weighted 
portfolio returns. But it remains statistically significant.
16
 For the later SEO sample, the addition of the 
investment factor makes little difference. For the sample of repurchases, the addition of the investment 
factor has little impact on the abnormal returns of either the early or the later sample. Therefore, 
adding the factor does not explain the disappearance of abnormal performance from the early to the 
later periods.   
Investor sentiment could also explain our findings. Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct an index 
of investor sentiment and show that it affects cross-sectional stock returns. We observe that their 
monthly index, updated till December 2010 and available in Jeff Wurgler’s website, is less volatile in 
our later sample period than in the early period. It raises a question of whether the disappearance of 
abnormal returns in the later period is explained by the relatively “flat” investor sentiment. To address 
this concern, we include the investor sentiment index along with the Fama-French three factors in the 
calendar time portfolio approach. The regression results, however, do not support this hypothesis. We 
still find, in the early sample, a positive (negative) and significant alpha for the portfolio of repurchase 
                                                          
16
 Sullivan and Zhang (2011) show that the negative investment-return relation weakens after controlling for 
external financing while the negative financing-return relation remains significant after controlling for 
investment, and conclude that the investment-return relation does not explain the abnormally low returns after 
external financing. 
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(SEO) stocks, but insignificant alphas for both portfolios in the later sample. The change in magnitude 
of the alphas due to the inclusion of this sentiment index is negligible. In fact, the coefficient estimates 
of the sentiment index are not significant in all the regressions. We therefore conclude that investor 
sentiment is unlikely to explain the disappearance of abnormal returns.  
3.3. Implications on the Negative Relation between Net Equity Issuance and Future Returns 
Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) show a negative and robust relation 
between net equity issuance and future stock returns. Their net equity issuance variables account for 
changes in shares due to seasoned equity offerings, share repurchases, employee stock option plans, or 
any other actions that trade ownership for cash or services. Stock splits and rights offerings are 
adjusted not to affect this variable. Interestingly, both studies end their sampling in 2003, roughly the 
ending point of our early sample. Since we show that, in the recent decade, abnormal returns do not 
exist following SEOs and repurchases, which are two major components of net equity issuance, it is 
interesting to examine if the negative relation between net equity issuance and future stock returns also 
weakens in the recent decade. We shall note, however, that although SEOs and repurchases, if they 
occur, would significantly affect the magnitude (but not as much the frequency) of net equity issuance, 
they are clearly not the same thing. Net equity issuance covers a broader range of events that change a 
firm’s share outstanding. Moreover, ours is an event study based on a sample of event occurrences 
(regardless of the amount of issuance/repurchase so long as it is at least 1% of the firm’s existing 
market capitalization, as discussed in Section 2 about our sampling), while theirs are of the cross-
sectional relation between the relative amount of net equity issuance and subsequent returns of stocks 
in the universe.  
We follow Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) to construct a 12-month net issuance variable (PW-
ISSUE) and a 60-month composite issuance variable (DT-ISSUE) as in Daniel and Titman (2006). 
Next we run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on these variables as 
well as the usual cross-sectional return determinants. Net equity issuance lags behind returns by six 
months for information of equity issuance to be revealed fully. The sample in the regressions includes 
all stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in 1980-2012.  
The results of both univariate and multiple regressions are reported in Table 2, respectively for 
the early (1980-2002) and the later (2003-2012) periods. We confirm the findings of Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008) and Daniel and Titman (2006) that, in the early period, net equity issuance 
significantly predicts future returns in the cross-section. In the later period, however, the negative 
relation weakens substantially. While the Pontiff and Woodgate’s 12-month share issuance still 
significantly predicts future returns, the magnitude reduces by two thirds. Daniel and Titman’s 60-
month share issuance loses its significance in predicting future returns. Since stock repurchases and 
SEOs are two major components of net equity issuance, the disappearance of abnormal returns 
following these two corporate stock transactions help to explain the reduced predictability. The return 
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predictability of size, book-to-market equity ratio, and momentum also reduces or disappears in the 
later period, which is consistent with a recent study by Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014). 
4. The Changing Market Environment and the Disappearance of Abnormal Returns 
Stock offerings and repurchases are important corporate stock transactions with many opposite 
features. The disappearance of abnormal performance following these two contrasting events is 
unlikely a coincidence. In this section, we review some significant changes in the stock market, and 
explore whether these changes affect our event firms and help to explain the disappearance of 
abnormal returns.  
4.1. The Changing Market Environment 
Long-run abnormal returns are often regarded as evidence of an inefficient market for these event 
stocks. Some further interpret the results as evidence of market timing, whereby firms issue stock 
when it is overpriced and repurchase stock when it is undervalued. Under this interpretation, the 
market not only misprices stocks at the beginning, but also fails to correct the mispricing fully at the 
event announcement. Post-announcement abnormal returns are then observed as information is 
gradually incorporated into the stock prices. The market’s failure to incorporate public information 
quickly into stock prices could be due to two factors: (1) marginal investors are not sophisticated 
enough to process the information, and/or (2) high transaction costs deter effective arbitrage. Next we 
discuss if these two factors have changed in the last decade.  
The stock market in the past decade is characterized by a higher proportion of more sophisticated 
institutional investors. Institutions with investment over $100 million in qualified securities are 
required to report their holdings in Form 13F with the SEC every quarter. We compute each stock’s 
quarterly institutional ownership (IO) based on Thomson Financial’s 13F filing. The median IO of 
CRSP stocks has increased steadily from less than 10% in 1980 to 60% by the end of 2012. In our 
event samples, as shown in Panel A of Table 3, the median IO of repurchasing stocks increases from 
38.5% for the early sample to 73.7% for the later sample, and the median IO of SEO stocks increases 
from 27.7% for the early sample to 48.7% for the later sample. Both nearly double. 
There is ubiquitous evidence in the literature that institutional investors improve price efficiency 
and reduce mispricing. Institutional investors are generally considered to be more effective than 
individual investors in accessing and processing information (e.g., Badrinath, Kale, and Noe, 1995; 
Sias and Starks, 1997; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). Moreover, more institutional holding mitigates 
short-sale constraint – a significant limit to arbitrage (e.g., D’Avolio, 2002). Nagel (2005) shows that 
cross-sectional return anomalies occur less in stocks with high institutional ownership.  
Hedge funds, a special type of institutional investors, are often regarded as active arbitrageurs. 
Stulz (2007, p.180) suggests that “hedge funds seek inefficiencies in the capital markets and attempt to 
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correct them, they can play a valuable role in financial markets by bringing security prices closer to 
fundamental values.” In comparison with other institutions such as mutual funds, he further argues that 
less regulation and the extensive use of short-sales and derivatives allow hedge funds to eliminate 
mispricing more forcefully. Kokkonen and Suominen (2012) provide direct evidence that hedge fund 
investment reduces mispricing and improves stock market efficiency. The stock market in the last 
decade is marked by a proliferation of hedge funds. In his AFA presidential address, Ken French 
(2008) shows that total assets managed by hedge funds grow from $38.9 billion in 1991 to $1,464.5 
billion in 2007. It grows further to $2,800 billion by the second quarter of 2014, according to a recent 
report by Hedge Fund Research.
17
 We follow a recent study by Agarwal, Jiang, Tang, and Yang 
(2013) to classify hedge funds holding (HF) from 13F filings.
18
 The median HF of CRSP stocks was 
nil before 1990s and has increased to above 10% in most of the past decade. In our event samples, as 
shown in Panel A of Table 3, the median HF from the early to the later samples has increased from 
3.25% to 11.63% for repurchases, and from 2.47% to 9.98% for SEOs.
19
   
As a result, relative to the early period, sophisticated institutional investors, including hedge 
funds, are more likely to be the marginal investors in the later period whose investment activities 
determine the price of our event stocks. They could improve pricing efficiency in two ways: (1) an 
event stock with high institutional ownership has a low chance to be mispriced in the first place, and 
(2) in case mispricing still occurs to the stock, institutional investors are more effective in identifying 
it and arbitraging it away.  
In addition to the increase in the number of arbitrageurs, the market also becomes more favorable 
for arbitrage activities. Trading costs, a significant limit of arbitrage, have been declining during this 
time period.
20
 In particular, the SEC ordered all U.S. stock markets to use decimalization in price 
quotes since April 2001. This regulatory change significantly reduces trading costs and improves 
market quality (Bessembinder, 2003), and institutional investors benefit most significantly 
(Chakravarty, Panchapagesan, and Wood, 2005). Lower trading costs imply an improvement in stock 
liquidity. Liquidity stimulates arbitrage activity, which, in turn, enhances pricing efficiency (Chordia, 
Roll, and Subramanyam, 2008). 
Further, the advent of new technology has allowed institutions to execute automated algorithmic 
trading. Algorithmic trading, although just started in the mid-1990s, has grown to be responsible for 
60-70% of the total trading volume of U.S. stocks in the recent years.
21
 Recent studies suggest that 
algorithmic trading is important in shaping the stock market. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld 
(2011), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013), and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2013) provide 
                                                          
17
 See “HFR Hedge Fund Industry Reports – Second Quarter 2014”. www.hedgefundresearch.com  
18
 We are grateful to the authors for sharing their classification data. 
19
 The time-series median IO and HF for CRSP stocks and the event stocks are available from the authors. 
20
 See Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2005), Brennan, Chordia, Subramanyam, and Tong (2012) for evidence 
of declining bid-ask spreads, price impact of transactions, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio and increasing 
turnover ratios. French (2008) provides a comprehensive survey of stock trading costs. 
21
 See “SEC runs eye over high-speed trading,” Financial Times, July 29, 2009. 
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evidence that algorithmic trading substantially improves liquidity, facilitates hedging, and makes stock 
prices more efficient. Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam (2011) show that, as a result of the lower cost 
and the improved technology, stock-trading activity explodes in recent years and the upswing is 
primarily contributed by institutional investors. More institutional trading makes stock pricing more 
efficient: intraday volatility has decreased and stock prices conform more closely to random walks. 
This is also confirmed in our event sample. As reported in Table 3 Panel A, liquidity, as measured by 
the Amihud’s (2002) ratio, and the variance ratio (measured as the ratio of per hour open-to-close 
stock return variance to close-to-open stock return variance during the 12 months prior to the event 
announcement), as proposed in French and Roll (1986) to capture how effective a stock price 
incorporates information, both improve substantially from the early to the later samples.  
Financial analysts are well known for producing information and facilitating information transfer. 
The number of analysts following a stock is frequently used as a measure of information transparency 
and an opaque and uncertain information environment deters arbitrage (e.g., Zhang, 2006). We find 
this metric also improves significantly for our event stocks using analyst coverage information from 
I/B/E/S. In the early sample, only 56% of the repurchase stocks and 40% of the SEO stocks are 
covered by analysts. The percentage of coverage increases to 88% in the later sample for both types of 
event stocks. The median number of analysts following from the early to the later samples increases 
from one to seven for the repurchases and from zero to four for the SEOs.  
4.2. The Relation Between Market Environment and the Long-Run Abnormal Returns 
In this section, we investigate whether the changing market environment for event stocks, as 
discussed above, plays a role in the disappearance of abnormal performance following corporate stock 
transactions. Specifically, we examine if the increase in institutional holding, hedge fund ownership, 
stock liquidity, number of analysts following, and pricing efficiency is associated with the 
disappearance of long-run abnormal returns for the events in the past decade.  
We adopt two empirical strategies for the test. For the first one, we classify our event sample into 
two groups based on whether the stock’s pre-event characteristics, such as institutional ownership 
(IO), are above or below the full sample median. By construction, half of the event stocks are in the 
high characteristic group and the other half in the low group. We then examine if the distribution of 
sample stocks in the high and low characteristic groups varies between the early and later samples, and 
how the long-run abnormal returns differ between the high and low characteristic groups. Taking IO as 
an illustration, 62% (38%) of the repurchasing stocks in the early sample have IO below (above) the 
full sample median; in contrast, in the later sample, 25% (75%) of the repurchasing stocks have IO 
below (above) the same benchmark. For the SEOs, 56% of the SEOs in the early sample have IO 
below the full sample median while only 34% of the later SEOs have IO below the median.  
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Panel B of Table 3 presents the long-run abnormal returns in a two-by-two matrix, respectively 
for the low- and high-IO groups, and for the early and later samples.
22
 The results send a clear 
message: High IO mitigates abnormal performance of event stocks. The long-run abnormal returns of 
stocks in the high-IO group, both for the early and later samples, and both for the repurchases and 
SEOs, are significantly lower than those in the low-IO group. Events that incur the most significant 
abnormal returns are in the low-IO group of the early sample. Since 62% (56%) of the repurchasing 
(SEO) firms are in this group, they tend to dominate in the early sample and produce positive 
(negative) abnormal returns following repurchases (SEOs). In contrast, in the later sample, 75% (66%) 
of the repurchasing (SEO) firms have high IO and these firms incur neither outperformance nor 
underperformance following these two events. They dominate in the later sample and produce no 
long-run abnormal performance.  
We perform similar analysis based on the other four characteristics. In the early sample, 64% of 
the repurchase stocks and 60% of the SEO stocks are in the low HF group, while in the later sample, 
only 21% of the repurchase stocks and 24% of the SEO stocks are in the low HF group. The long-run 
abnormal return results, presented in Panel B of Table 3, are similar to those based on IO. In 
particular, abnormal performance is absent in the high HF group of both the early and later samples, 
and is most significant in the low HF group of the early sample. The evidence supports that the 
increasing hedge fund investments in the last decade mitigate abnormal performance following 
corporate stock transactions.  
Examinations based on the liquidity ratio, the number of analysts following, and the variance 
ratio yield consistent results as shown in Panel B of Table 3. The majority of the event stocks in the 
early sample are relatively less liquid, followed by fewer analysts, and less effective in incorporating 
information into prices as suggested by the low variance ratios. The abnormal returns are most 
significant in these stocks. In contrast, the majority of the later sample is characterized by better 
liquidity, more analyst following, and higher variance ratios.    
Above we have shown that various factors related to pricing efficiency help to explain the 
disappearing long-run abnormal returns, but these factors are potentially related to firm characteristics. 
For example, stocks with larger market capitalization are generally more liquid and held more by 
institutions. In other words, these pricing efficiency factors could also capture firm characteristics that 
are potentially related to long-run abnormal returns. In our second empirical strategy, we address this 
by multiple regressions of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on the variables of pricing 
efficiency after controlling for other firm characteristics. Due to the different nature of abnormal 
                                                          
22
 For brevity, we tabulate the return results based on the equal-weighted calendar-time portfolio approach only. 
The results (available from the authors) hold similarly across other estimation methods of long-run abnormal 
returns. 
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return estimation, we can only perform multiple regressions on BHARs (the other two abnormal return 
measures are estimated on the basis of calendar month portfolio or event month portfolio, hence we do 
not have one estimate for each individual stock to be used in regressions). 
 The regression results are reported in Table 4. High institutional ownership, high hedge fund 
ownership, better liquidity, more analysts following, and high variance ratio are shown to mitigate the 
post-event long-run abnormal returns even after controlling for various firm characteristics. 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) suggests that long-run BHAR could be associated with event firms’ 
characteristics other than size and B/M, in particular, prior returns, volatility of returns, and capital 
investment.
 23
 We control for these firm characteristics in regressions. We find that factors related to 
better pricing efficiency are associated with significant reductions in both the positive abnormal 
performance following repurchases and the negative abnormal performance following SEOs. 
Moreover, the economic significance is substantial. For example, one standard deviation increase in 
institutional ownership (hedge fund ownership) is associated with a reduction of 3.56% (3.75%) 
BHAR for repurchases and an increase of 7.40% (5.95%) BHAR for SEOs.
24
 Overall, the evidence 
lends support to the impact of the changes in market environment and pricing efficiency on the 
disappearing abnormal performance. 
5. The Changing Corporate Behavior in the Changing Market 
The findings of significant long-run abnormal returns have spurred much research interest in 
event firm behavior. As we discussed earlier, event firm market timing is proposed as a popular 
explanation for the post-event abnormal return performance.
25
 Consistent with this view, Loughran 
and Ritter (1997) find significant deterioration in operating performance following SEOs. Firms issue 
equity before their poor operating performance gets revealed to the market and the price drops. Some 
studies even argue that firms’ timing behavior could be more proactive – firms mislead investors by 
manipulating earnings and information disclosure prior to the event. In this section we investigate if 
event firms have changed behavior in the past decade, perhaps in response to the changing market and 
regulatory environment. Besides the external market factors, internal firm factors, such as event 
motivation and corporate behavior, could also be important in understanding the disappearance of 
abnormal returns. 
5.1. Earnings and Information Flow Manipulation Prior to the Events 
                                                          
23
 Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) show that long-run abnormal returns following SEOs in the 1980 to 2005 
period can be explained by controlling for differences between event and control firms in terms of characteristics 
such as idiosyncratic volatility, prior returns, and illiquidity.  However, as they note, their study does not directly 
address market efficiency, since they explain event firm abnormal returns on the basis of market-wide return 
regularities, including momentum and the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle that are not themselves well understood.  
24
 Note that, as shown in Table 1, the overall sample BHARs for repurchase and SEO stocks are 6.09% and -
19.73%, respectively. Also, one standard deviation increase in stock liquidity (variance ratio) is associated with a 
reduction of 5.21% (4.03%) BHAR for repurchases and an increase of 5.10% (6.45%) BHAR for SEOs. 
25
 See, for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995), Kim and Weisbach (2008), and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), 
Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013), among others. 
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Existing studies suggest that firms manage earnings to mislead investors and influence stock price 
before SEOs and repurchases. In particular, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) show that SEO firms 
inflate discretionary accounting accruals to report higher earnings prior to the offering and the inflated 
accruals are negatively related to the post-SEO long-run abnormal returns. Gong, Louis, and Sun 
(2008) find that repurchase firms, in contrast, understate discretionary accruals to manage earnings 
downward before the event. Similar to SEO firms, the abnormal accruals before repurchases are 
negatively related to subsequent stock returns. Both studies conclude that the post-event abnormal 
returns are, at least partly, attributed to investors being misled by event firm earnings manipulation.  
The SEC passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in April 2002. The law promulgates the 
independence and oversight of audit committee and strengthens corporate governance, rendering 
earnings manipulation under tighter scrutiny. Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) find that accrual-based 
earnings management has generally declined after the SOX. We investigate if this is particularly true 
for our event firms. We measure earnings management by industry-performance-adjusted abnormal 
accruals, as in Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) and detailed in the Appendix. Panel A of Table 5 presents 
the mean and median abnormal accruals in the two quarters before the event. We confirm Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) that, in the early sample, SEO firms 
manage earnings upward and repurchase firms manage earnings downward prior to the event. In the 
later sample, however, we do not find evidence of earnings management. The only number that is 
statistically significant (i.e., the mean abnormal accruals of SEOs) in the later sample has the opposite 
sign to the earning management hypothesis. Since earnings management is shown in previous studies 
to be responsible for the post-event abnormal returns, firms’ refraining from this old practice after the 
SOX contributes to the disappearance of abnormal returns.  
Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008) find that managers increase both the frequency and the 
magnitude of bad news announcements in the month before repurchasing shares. Such a manipulation 
of information flows depresses stock price before the repurchase. We examine if this practice has 
changed for the recent repurchases. Following Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), we examine 
management voluntary forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS), obtained from First Call, in the 
month prior to the announcement. We classify a management forecast as good (bad) news if the three-
day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-1, 1), is positive (negative); the magnitude of CAR measures 
the how good (bad) the news is. The results, reported in Panel B of Table 5, suggest that repurchase 
firms are indeed more likely to report bad news before the event. The null for the likelihood of 
reporting bad news should be 50%. If we compare across the early and the later samples, this 
likelihood reduces, from 17% above the null to 10% above the null; the magnitude of bad news also 
reduces by half. The reductions are thus significant both statistically and economically. The evidence 
suggests that recent repurchase firms are less involved in information flow manipulation, which in turn 
improves the information environment and mitigates the occurrence of post-event abnormal returns. 
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We find weaker evidence of information flow manipulation prior to SEOs. Issuers tend to report more 
good news than bad news before the SEO, but the economic magnitude is not large.  
5.2. Do Event Firms Time the Market Less? 
Literature suggests that managers learn information from the market in making corporate 
investment decisions (Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 
2012; Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2013). If stock pricing becomes more efficient, as manifested by 
the increased presence of sophisticated arbitragers, reduced trading costs, more analysts following, 
improved liquidity, and more efficient incorporation of information into prices, an interesting question 
is whether firms react to the changes in market environment by timing the market less.  
Market timing is a popular explanation for the repurchase and SEO decisions and the subsequent 
long-run abnormal returns. Under the market timing hypothesis, stocks are assumed to be mispriced 
from time to time. Firms time the market by selling new shares when overpriced and buying back 
stocks when undervalued. If stock prices reflect firm fundamental value more closely and timely, the 
chance of mispricing diminishes, so does the opportunity to exploit mispricing. As a result, recent 
events might be motivated by other reasons than to exploit mispricing. The firms are expected to 
exhibit less of the market-timer characteristics than those in the early years.  
Existing evidence to support the market-timing hypothesis includes: (1) repurchasing (SEO) firms 
are often under- (over-) valued at the time of announcement, as indicated by their inordinately high 
(low) book-to-market equity ratio (B/M); and (2) repurchasing (SEO) firms tend to have abnormally 
poor (superior) returns in the year before the announcement, triggering the event decisions. It is 
appealing to infer mispricing from B/M and prior stock return. Market value of equity being the 
denominator, B/M is expected to be abnormally high (low) for an undervalued (overvalued) firm. 
Mispricing, often regarded as “the window of opportunity”, is more of a transient phenomenon. 
Hence, an undervalued (overvalued) firm might have incurred abnormally low (high) returns in the 
preceding period. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that the prior-year return predicts future 
abnormal returns of repurchasing stocks and interpret it as evidence of market-timing. We investigate 
whether these two patterns, established in the prior literature, have changed in the later sample.  
We compare B/M and the prior 12-month return of the event firms against their contemporaneous 
Fama-French industry median. Table 6 presents the average industry-adjusted characteristics 
respectively for the early and later subsamples. Results can be summarized as follows. In the early 
sample, repurchase firms on average have a significantly higher B/M ratio than their industry median 
before the announcement, suggesting undervaluation a possible trigger for the events. This pattern 
remains in the later sample for the mean B/M but not for the median. The lack of evidence for the 
median itself suggests that recent repurchase firms are not undervalued relative to their industry peers. 
If we compare the early sample with the later sample, the mean difference in the industry-adjusted 
B/M decreases substantially, from 0.137 to 0.063, and the drop is statistically significant at the 1% 
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level. The prior 12-month returns yield consistent results. In the early sample, repurchase firms incur 
10% more negative return in the year before the announcement than their contemporaneous industry 
return, indicating potential undervaluation. In contrast, repurchase firms in the later sample achieve 
returns similar to their industry peers in the prior year. The overall evidence suggests that fewer 
repurchases in recent years than those in the early years are motivated by market timing, since they do 
not seem as undervalued as before in the first place.  
The evidence on SEOs points to a similar conclusion: Fewer of the recent SEOs are carried out to 
time the market. We find that, although SEO firms generally have lower B/M ratios and higher prior 
returns than their industry peers, the differences reduce significantly for the recent SEOs. Compared 
with SEO firms in the early years, recent SEO firms have significantly higher B/M ratios and lower 
prior returns. Stock overvaluation and market timing might still trigger some SEOs; nevertheless, they 
become less important compared to the early years.  
Although B/M and prior return are indicative of mispricing, they are also used as measures of 
firm investment opportunities. New investment opportunities increase stock price and reduce the B/M 
ratio. This is particularly true for SEO firms (Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino, 2006). We take two 
actions to address this potential confounding effect. First, we control the investment opportunities 
component of the ratio. Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) propose a way to 
decompose a firm’s log M/B equity ratio into a component of growth opportunities and another 
component of (firm-level and industry-wide) mispricing,    (
 
 
)     (
 
 
)     (
 
 
). V stands for 
the unobservable intrinsic value of equity. Based on the residual income model in accounting, 
Rhodes–Kropf, et al. assume that V is a linear function of the firm’s book value of equity, net income, 
and leverage, and thus can be estimated with the fitted value in regressions.    (
 
 
), therefore, 
measures equity mispricing after controlling growth opportunities (   (
 
 
)). 
We follow Rhodes-Kropf et al. to estimate    (
 
 
) for our event stocks prior to the 
announcement (the empirical procedure is described in the Appendix). The estimated results are also 
reported in Table 6, respectively for the early and later event samples. A positive (negative) 
   (
 
 
) implies overvaluation (undervaluation). We find that, based on this measure, repurchase 
stocks in the early sample are not significantly under- or over-valued; but repurchase stocks in the later 
sample are significantly overpriced prior to the announcement. The evidence does not support market-
timing as a primary motive for repurchases, and much less so in the later sample. The estimates for 
SEO stocks prior to the offering are significantly positive for both the early and the later samples, 
suggesting a high chance of overvaluation for SEO stocks. However, the magnitude of mispricing is 
significantly smaller for the later sample. We therefore argue that if market-timing is a primary motive 
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for SEOs in the early sample, it becomes less so in the later sample. In general, the results are 
qualitatively consistent with those based on the industry-median adjusted ratios.  
Second, we examine the ratio of R&D expenses to Assets (RD/A). This ratio is also used to 
measure a firm’s investment opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992) and it does not involve stock 
price (so mispricing-purged). Thus, investigation on this variable helps to disentangle if our evidence 
on the changes in B/M and prior return reflects changes in investment opportunities or changes in 
mispricing for the event stocks. If the former is true, we expect to observe a consistent pattern of 
change in RD/A from the early to the later samples, that is, there would be an increase in RD/A for 
repurchase firms and a decrease in RD/A for SEO firms. The results are reported in Table 6. In 
general, repurchase firms tend to have a lower RD/A ratio than their industry median but SEO firms 
have a higher ratio than their industry median. However, if we compare between the early and later 
samples, the pattern of RD/A goes the opposite to those of B/M and prior return if they are meant to 
capture more of investment opportunities. We thus argue that the changes in B/M and prior return 
across the early and later samples reflect more of the changes in mispricing of the event stocks.  
We further examine several other variables that are used in previous studies to suggest 
repurchases and SEOs as market-timing tools. First, we investigate the change in investment 
recommendation made by financial analysts prior to repurchase and SEO announcement. Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) find that, in a sample of repurchases before 2002, analysts are often disappointed by 
earnings and downgrade these firms in investment recommendation. Firms take advantage of the 
excess pessimism by repurchasing undervalued shares. Similarly, SEOs could be issuing firms’ 
opportunistic reaction to analysts’ over optimism. We extend the analysis into the recent sample. 
I/B/E/S collects analyst recommendations and maintains a standard scheme of recommendation scores 
(Thomson Reuters standardized 5-point scale), that is, 1 for strong buy, 2 for buy, 3 for hold, 4 for 
underperform, and 5 for sell. Changes in analyst recommendation are measured as changes in the 
average recommendation scores from the 12th month before to the month before the announcement. A 
positive (negative) change means downgrade (upgrade) in investment recommendation. We compare 
the score change between the early and the later samples and present the results in Table 6. Consistent 
with Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), repurchases in the early sample are often preceded by analyst 
downgrade. However, this pattern disappears in the later sample; no significant change is found in 
analyst recommendation before the announcement. Similarly, firms tend to conduct SEOs following 
analyst optimistic recommendation in the early period, but not any more in the recent decade. Overall, 
the evidence indicates that corporate stock transactions after 2002 are less likely to time analysts’ 
pessimism or optimism than they were before. 
Second, we compare insider trading prior to the SEOs in the early and later samples. Clarke, 
Dunbar, and Kahle (2001) find that insider selling increases prior to SEOs and it predicts the post-SEO 
long-run abnormal returns. They interpret the evidence as insiders exploiting market overvaluation in 
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the SEO decisions. If recent events are less motivated by market timing, as argued above, we expect to 
observe weaker evidence of insider trading in the later sample. Following Clarke, et al. (2001), we 
define insider net sales in the year before the SEO announcement as the monthly average sales minus 
purchases denominated by shares outstanding. Insiders’ abnormal net sales is defined as actual net 
sales minus expected net sales, which is the monthly average net sales from the 48th month to the 13th 
month before the announcement. Insider trading data are from Thomson Reuters Insider Filings. The 
results reported in Table 6 suggest that insider trading behavior also changes in the recent decade. 
Specifically, insiders sell shares before the early SEOs but not so in the recent period. This is 
consistent with recent SEOs less motivated by market timing incentives. For repurchases, we find that 
insiders are net sellers prior to the announcement both in the early and later samples. Bonaime and 
Ryngaert (2013) argue that insider trading is not informative of whether repurchases are motivated by 
undervaluation. 
We examine one additional variable that is also indicative of SEO firms’ market-timing 
incentives. SEO firms may offer both primary and secondary shares. Unlike new primary shares, 
secondary shares are pre-owned often by large shareholders. Many of them are insiders or have access 
to insider information. If an SEO is to time the market, Kim and Weisbach (2008) argue that the 
fraction of secondary shares offered in the total issuance would be higher. They find that the fraction 
of secondary shares is positively related to the issuer’s valuation. If recent SEOs are less driven by 
market timing, we expect to observe declines in both frequency and size (relative to the total issuance) 
of secondary offerings. The results presented in Table 6 confirm this hypothesis. 
In addition to the univariate analysis on the event firm market-timing characteristics, we examine 
how firms’ market-timing incentives affect their repurchase/SEO decisions in a multivariate 
framework analysis. In particular, we run logit regressions for all Compustat industrial firms to assess 
whether a firm’s SEO and repurchase decisions are related to its B/M ratio, prior 12-month return, and 
future three-year return. The market-timing hypothesis predicts that the SEO decision is positively 
related to the prior excess return and negatively related to the B/M ratio and future excess return; the 
opposite is expected for repurchase decisions. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010) use this method 
to assess the market-timing motivation of SEOs. For our research purpose, we augment their method 
by including a post-2002 dummy and interact it with the three market-timing incentive variables in the 
regression. If recent repurchases/SEOs are less likely to be triggered by market-timing incentives, we 
expect the coefficients of these variables to decrease in magnitude. While we confirm the significance 
of these variables in explaining event decisions in the early sample, as the market timing hypothesis 
suggests, the evidence weakens or even disappears in the later sample. The interactions of these 
variables with the post-2002 dummy yield significant coefficient estimates with opposite signs. The 
results (not tabulated for brevity) confirm that market timing, as a motivation for corporate stock 
transactions, becomes less important in the most recent decade.  
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Long-run abnormal returns following repurchases and SEOs are more significant in small firms 
(Brav, Geczy, and Gompers, 2000; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009). It is necessary to examine if the 
disappearance of long-run abnormal returns in the recent decade is a result of increasing size of event 
firms. Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) find that the post-IPO underperformance disappears after 2000. 
They ascribe it to a significant change in the composition of IPO firms – small IPOs, responsible 
primarily for the return underperformance in the early sample, largely vanish after 2000. We compare 
market capitalization (ME) of the event firms against their contemporaneous industry median. ME, in 
logarithm, is measured as of the month end before the announcement, adjusted by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) to December 2002 dollars. As shown in Table 6, both repurchase and SEO firms in the 
early sample appear to be larger than their industry medians. This size dominance persists for 
repurchase firms in the later period but disappears for the later SEO firms, suggesting that an 
increasing number of small firms conduct SEOs in the recent years.
26
 Since mispricing is more likely 
to occur in small firms, the fact that repurchase firms remain large in size and, unlike IPOs, SEO firms 
decrease in average size does not explain the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns.  
5.3. What Else Motivates Recent Repurchases and SEOs? 
If recent repurchases and SEOs are less motivated by market-timing incentives, what else could 
drive the decision of these events? Are the different motivations related to the disappearance of 
abnormal returns?  
Share repurchases, together with dividends, are the two primary ways of corporate payout. Firms 
prefer repurchase to dividend when financial flexibility is in need (e.g., Guay and Harford, 2000; 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000). The more recent literature suggests that repurchases are 
increasingly used in place of dividends in payout (e.g., Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008).
27
 
To see how repurchases are used recently more often as a regular payout mode (instead of a market-
timing tool), we examine the proportion of repurchase in cash distribution, the frequency of 
repurchases conducted by event firms in the past five years and the completion rate of the announced 
repurchase programs in the following two years. We also examine repurchase firms’ cash flow 
volatility, non-operating cash flows, and interest coverage ratio prior to the event. Guay and Harford 
(2000) and Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) suggest that repurchases, relative to 
dividends, are preferred by firms with high cash flow volatility and high non-operating cash flows. 
Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2013) also highlight the impact of financial condition on corporate 
repurchase decisions. If repurchases are used in recent years more as a regular method to pay out, we 
expect firms to conduct repurchases more frequently and have higher completion rates of their 
                                                          
26
 Further analysis confirms that an increasing number of small firms conduct SEOs after the 2008 financial 
crisis. However, excluding events or event returns during the financial crisis period (09/2008 – 06/2009) does 
not drive the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns.    
27
 See Huang and Thakor (2013) for an explanation of share repurchases being used for strategic purpose. 
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announced programs. Moreover, these firms might carry features of past dividend payers such as high 
interest coverage ratio and are not limited to those with high cash flow volatility and high non-
operating cash flows.  
The results, presented in Table 7, are consistent with recent repurchases being more of a regular 
payout mode. In our early period, the percentage of firms using repurchases, among firms with 
positive payout, is 56%; this percentage increases to 72% during 2003-2012. If measured by dollar 
amount, the percentage of dollars paid out through repurchases is 42% in the early period and 61% in 
the later period. The median firm in the later sample conducts repurchases three times during the past 
five years, while the median firm in the early sample only conducts once over the past five years. The 
median firm in the later sample fully completes the announced repurchase program within two years 
following the announcement, while the median firm in the early sample completes less than two-thirds 
of the program. Relative to those in the early sample, recent repurchase firms have lower cash flow 
volatility, lower non-operating income, and higher interest coverage ratio. The differences in these 
variables are all statistically significant. Overall, repurchases are more frequently used to distribute 
persistent cash flows in the later sample.  
Loughran and Ritter (1997) show that the operating performance of SEO firms improves prior to 
the offering and then deteriorates significantly after the offering, mimicking the return pattern 
surrounding SEOs. They interpret the evidence as consistent with the market timing hypothesis. Firms 
conduct SEOs at the peak of its operating performance and investors extrapolate future earnings from 
the past value. Besides market-timing, SEOs could be motivated to raise investment capital (Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008) or to solve near-term financial needs (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2010). If 
firms have productive operating reasons for SEOs, we expect to observe improvement, at least not 
deterioration, in operating performance after the offering.  
Table 8 presents the operating performance from three years before to three years after the SEO, 
respectively for the early sample (Panel A) and the later sample (Panel B). Operating performance is 
measured by four variables: the ratio of operating income before depreciation to assets (OIBDP/A), 
the ratio of net income to assets (ROA), the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales 
(OIBDP/Sales), and the ratio of net income to sales (Profit Margin), permuting two sets of numerators 
(OIBDP, Net Income) and two sets of denominators (Total Assets, Sales). We confirm the main 
findings of Loughran and Ritter (1997) in the early sample that operating performance improves 
before and then deteriorates subsequent to the offering. The pattern changes for the later sample. 
Compared with the performance measures in the year before the offering, all four measures of 
operating performance improve significantly in the three years following the offering. We explore two 
plausible uses of the proceeds – saving cash or increasing capital expenditure, and find that, for the 
early sample, the cash to assets ratio increases and the capital expenditure to assets ratio decreases 
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significantly from year -1 to +3. In contrast, for the later sample, the cash ratio decreases significantly 
and the capital expenditure ratio remains the same during the same time span. Note that the 
denominator, total assets, increases after the SEO (as shown in the last column). The evidence thus 
suggests that, compared with the early SEOs, recent SEOs are conducted more for investment capital 
than to increase cash balance. Recall in Table 6, we show that recent SEO firms also have higher 
RD/A – more growth opportunities – before the offering. Overall, we argue that recent SEOs are 
motivated for more productive uses of the proceeds, as confirmed by their improved operating 
performance following the SEOs.
28
  
Last but not least, we examine the announcement returns of these two events. Our findings also 
suggest that the events in the early and later samples are motivated by different reasons. If stock 
pricing becomes more efficient in the later period but the event firms, similar to those in the early 
sample, are motivated by mispricing and market-timing, we should expect to observe announcement 
returns in a much larger magnitude together with the disappearance of long-run abnormal returns. In 
other words, investors correct the mispricing fully at the announcement (no underreaction) so that 
there is no long-run abnormal performance. In contrast, if recent event firms are not primarily 
motivated by mispricing and market-timing, we expect to observe smaller announcement returns since 
the signaling of mispricing is less and the events are driven by more productive operating reasons. We 
estimate the five-day (-2, +2) cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date for 
repurchasing and SEO firms, using the conventional market model with the CRSP value-weighted 
return as the market portfolio,                . The parameters of the market model, alpha and 
beta, are estimated based on the daily returns from day -365 to day -60 relative to the announcement 
date. Abnormal returns are the difference between the realized return and the fitted expected return, 
accumulated over the announcement window. The mean CAR for repurchase stocks is 2.91% in the 
early sample and 1.78% in the later sample. The mean CAR for SEO stocks is -2.69% in the early 
sample and -1.99% in the later sample. They are all statistically significant at the 1% level. We 
confirm the literature that the announcement returns are significantly positive for repurchases and 
negative for SEOs. The magnitude of the announcement returns, however, reduces from the early to 
the later samples. The reductions are also statistically significant at the 1% level for both events.  
To summarize, in addition to external market factors suggesting more effective arbitrage, event 
motivations and event firm characteristics and behavior also contribute to the disappearance of the 
post-event abnormal returns. Recent event firms exhibit less opportunistic behavior in stock 
repurchases and offerings and the events are conducted more for reasons of business operation than for 
                                                          
28
 We similarly examine the operating performance of repurchase firms and find significant declines in both the 
early and later samples. Our findings are consistent with Grullon and Michaely (2004). They interpret the 
evidence as a support for firms’ motivation for repurchases being paying out excess cash in the anticipation of 
fewer growth opportunities to mitigate the agency problem of free cash flows. 
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exploiting mispricing. The differences in multiple aspects between the early and later event firms 
challenge the fundamental rationale behind the persistence of long-run abnormal returns.   
6.   Conclusion  
Early studies document significant stock return outperformance following repurchases and 
underperformance following SEOs. The findings of long-run abnormal returns are often used to imply 
stock mispricing and event firm opportunistic market timing. We find that the long-run abnormal 
returns are absent for these two events in the most recent decade. The disappearance of abnormal 
performance is robust to the choice of asset pricing models and other methodological issues.  
The disappearance is consistent with an improvement in pricing efficiency of event stocks. 
Compared with event stocks in the early period, recent event stocks are held and traded more by 
institutions and hedge funds, are followed by more financial analysts (i.e., more transparent in 
information), and are more liquid and less costly to trade. In addition to these external market factors, 
internal firm factors also contribute to the disappearance of abnormal returns. Due to enhanced 
regulations, recent event firms refrain from manipulating earnings and information disclosure to 
mislead investors. Recent events are less motivated for the purpose of market-timing; instead, they 
seem motivated more for business operating reasons. Repurchases are carried out as a regular 
corporate payout tool and SEOs are conducted to raise investment capital and to improve the issuer’s 
operating performance.  
Our study challenges the persistence of long-run abnormal returns and any static view on market 
efficiency. In addition, we explore the implications of pricing efficiency dynamics on corporate 
decisions. Investors, firms, and the market itself interact and evolve over time. The dynamics exert 
important influence on both asset pricing and corporate behavior.  
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Table 1 Long-Run Abnormal Returns Following Stock Repurchases and SEOs 
 
This table reports the event firm abnormal returns in 36 months following the announcement of stock 
repurchases (in Panel A) and seasoned equity offerings (in Panel B). Long-run abnormal returns, presented in 
four columns, are estimated respectively using three methods: (1) the calendar-time portfolio approach, 
respectively using equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio returns; (2) Ibbotson’s (1975) return across time 
and securities (IRATS); and (3) the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) relative to control firms matched on 
size, B/M, and momentum. Abnormal returns are estimated for the full sample, i.e., 1984-2012 for repurchases 
and 1980-2012 for SEOs, as well as separately for the early sample (ending in 2002) and the later sample (2003-
2012). Statistical significance of the abnormal returns, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to the significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The last column 
reports the number (and the percentage) of event observations in each sample period.  
 
Panel A: Long-run abnormal returns following stock repurchases 
Sample Period 
Calendar-Time  
IRATS BHAR N (%) 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
1984-2012 7.92%*** 4.68%* 10.12%*** 6.09%*** 14309 (100%) 
 (2.89) (1.85) (12.87) (5.29)  
1984-2002 7.96%** 7.20%** 14.74%*** 9.15%*** 9657 (67.5%) 
 (2.20) (2.09) (15.32) (6.32)  
2003-2012 5.32% -1.80% -2.94%** -2.52% 4652 (32.5%) 
 (1.45) (-0.43) (-2.14) (-1.55)  
 
Panel B: Long-run abnormal returns following SEOs  
Sample Period 
Calendar-Time 
IRATS BHAR  N (%) 
Equal-weighted  Value-weighted 
1980-2012 -17.28%*** -13.32%** -18.09%*** -19.73%*** 6739 (100%) 
 (-3.64) (-2.34) (-13.09) (-10.99)  
1980-2002 -20.88%*** -16.20%** -19.82%*** -23.26%*** 4913 (72.9%) 
 (-3.84) (-2.22) (-12.00) (-11.21)  
2003-2012 -5.04% -0.36% -6.15%** -6.18% 1826 (27.1%) 
 (-0.57) (-0.02) (-2.12) (-1.59)  
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Table 2 Net Equity Issuance and Future Stock Returns in the Cross-Section 
This table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly stock returns on net 
equity issuances, respectively for the early period, 1980-2002, and the later period, 2003-2012. The sample 
includes all stocks traded in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. The empirical methods follow Pontiff and Woodgate 
(2008). The dependent variable is stock returns at month t. Net equity issuance is measured for two time periods: 
PW-ISSUE = log(Share outstanding, t-6) – log(Share outstanding, t-17); DT-ISSUE = log(Share outstanding, t-
6) – log(Share outstanding, t-65). Lagging net equity issuance by six months is to allow information of issuance 
fully revealed to the market. DT-Dum is a dummy variable equals one if share outstanding exists at t-65 (and 
thus DT-ISSUE exists), and zero otherwise. The impact of stock dividends and splits on shares outstanding are 
adjusted as in Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) not to affect the issuance measures. Other control variables include 
the natural logarithm of market capitalization at t-6 (ME), the natural logarithm of the book-to-market equity 
ratio in the previous fiscal year (B/M), a book-to-market dummy variable (BM-Dum) that equals one if B/M is 
not missing and zero otherwise, and the past six-month return from t-2 to t-7 as a proxy for return momentum 
(MOM). The table reports the time-series average coefficient estimates from the monthly cross-sectional 
regressions. The associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses, evaluated based on the standard error of the 
time-series estimates. Statistical significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to the significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Sample period PW-ISSUE DT-ISSUE DT-Dum ME B/M BM-Dum MOM Avg. 2 
 
 
Early period: 
1980-2002 
-1.56*** 
(-5.61) 
      0.26 
 -0.58*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.68*** 
(-3.87) 
    0.61 
-1.01*** 
(-5.75) 
-0.26*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.46*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.44) 
0.16** 
(2.16) 
0.38*** 
(3.56) 
0.60** 
(2.12) 
2.91 
 
 
Later period: 
2003-2012 
-0.53*** 
(-3.38) 
      0.09 
 -0.20 
(-1.56) 
-0.25* 
(-1.81) 
    0.33 
-0.32*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.15 
(-1.22) 
-0.20 
(-1.49) 
-0.13** 
(-2.11) 
0.05 
(0.73) 
0.19 
(0.87) 
-0.23 
(-0.40) 
2.50 
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Table 3 Changing Market Environment and the Long-Run Abnormal Returns  
 
Panel A presents the mean and median (in the square brackets) institutional ownership, hedge fund ownership, 
liquidity ratio, number of analyst following, and variance ratio of the early and later event samples. Institutional 
ownership is the percentage of the event firm shares held by 13F filing institutions in aggregate relative to the 
total number of shares outstanding in the quarter prior to the event announcement. Hedge fund ownership is the 
percentage of the event firm shares held by hedge funds in aggregate relative to the total number of shares 
outstanding in the quarter prior to the event announcement. Liquidity is computed as in Amihud (2002); it is the 
average of the daily absolute return divided by the daily dollar trading volume. We then compute the 12 month 
average prior to the event announcement. The Amihud ratio is higher for illiquid stocks. For easy illustration, we 
put a negative sign of the estimated illiquidity ratio, so a higher value suggests the stock is more liquid. Number 
of analysts following is the number of analysts who follow the event stock as of the announcement month. 
Variance ratio, first proposed in French and Roll (1986), is the ratio of per hour open-to-close stock return 
variance to close-to-open stock return variance during the 12 month prior to the event announcement. The last 
column reports the mean and median differences between the later and early samples. The significance of the 
mean differences is tested by the t-test, and the significance of the median differences is tested by the Wilcoxon 
Kruskal-Wallis test. Statistical significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to the significance levels of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Based on the full sample median characteristics, we divide the early and later samples further into low and high 
characteristic groups. Panel B presents the long-run abnormal returns, estimated under the calendar-time 
approach using equal-weighted portfolio returns, respectively for the low and high characteristic groups. 
Statistical significance of the abnormal returns, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to the significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The percentage 
distribution of the sample events between the high and low characteristic groups are reported in the square 
brackets.  
 
Panel A: Mean and median event firm characteristics related to pricing efficiency 
 Full sample Early sample Later sample Difference 
(Later – Early) 
Repurchases 
 
Institutional Ownership 48.31% 
[48.15%] 
39.52% 
[38.54%] 
66.38% 
[73.65%] 
26.86%*** 
[35.11%***] 
Hedge Fund Ownership 7.80% 
[5.43%] 
5.16% 
[3.25%] 
13.23% 
[11.63%] 
8.07%*** 
[8.38%***] 
Liquidity Ratio -0.533 
[-0.016] 
-0.644 
[-0.043] 
-0.314 
[-0.002] 
0.330*** 
[0.041***] 
Number of Analysts Following 5.69 
[3.00] 
3.93 
[1.00] 
9.35 
[7.00] 
5.42*** 
[6.00***] 
Variance Ratio 12.84 
[11.83] 
11.87 
[10.22] 
14.31 
[13.64] 
2.44*** 
[3.42***] 
SEOs     
     
Institutional Ownership 37.47% 
[32.37%] 
32.62% 
[27.65%] 
49.77% 
[48.69%] 
17.15%*** 
[21.04%***] 
Hedge Fund Ownership 6.85% 
[4.09%] 
4.58% 
[2.47%] 
12.64% 
[9.98%] 
8.06%*** 
[7.51%***] 
Liquidity Ratio -0.548 
[-0.074] 
-0.595 
[-0.112] 
-0.443 
[-0.028] 
0.152*** 
[0.084***] 
Number of Analysts Following 3.12 
[1.00] 
2.14 
[0.00] 
5.76 
[4.00] 
3.62*** 
[4.00***] 
Variance Ratio 14.72 
[14.08] 
13.24 
[12.27] 
16.82 
[16.35] 
3.58*** 
[4.08***] 
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Panel B Long-run abnormal returns in the high and low characteristic groups 
 Institutional Ownership Hedge Fund Ownership Liquidity Ratio Num. Analysts Following Variance Ratio 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Repurchases  
 
          
Early sample 0.32%*** 0.07% 0.29%*** 0.16% 0.28%** 0.08% 0.36%*** 0.17% 0.68%*** 0.13% 
 (2.77) (0.65) (2.65) (1.47) (2.43) (0.68) 3.05 1.12 (4.24) (0.84) 
 [62.12%] [37.88%] [64.14%] [35.86%] [61.59%] [38.41%] [65.83%] [34.17%] [57.35%] [42.65%] 
Later sample 0.18% 0.11% 0.18% 0.12% 0.28%* 0.06% 0.18% 0.11% 0.23%* 0.09% 
 (1.17) (1.10) (1.13) (1.20) (1.98) (0.55) (1.38) (0.92) (1.81) (0.88) 
 [24.84%] [75.16%] [20.65%] [79.35%] [26.85%] [73.15%] [31.00%] [69.00%] [38.69%] [61.31%] 
SEOs 
 
          
Early sample -0.60%*** -0.32%** -0.52%*** -0.23% -0.56%*** -0.36%** -0.61%*** -0.51%** -0.61%*** -0.52%* 
 (-2.77) (-2.21) (-2.82) (-1.20) (-3.62) (-2.31) (-3.30) (-2.02) (-2.83) (-1.77) 
 [56.24%] [43.76%] [60.32%] [39.68%] [57.10%] [42.90%] [80.30%] [19.70%] [59.29%] [40.71%] 
Later sample -0.45% -0.24% -0.39% -0.29% -0.37% -0.27% -0.10% -0.27% 0.25% -0.38% 
 (-0.98) (-1.19) (-0.89) (-1.28) (-0.61) (-1.47) (-0.15) (-1.24) (0.81) (-1.15) 
 [34.04%] [65.96%] [23.55%] [76.45%] [33.72%] [66.28%] [21.09%] [78.91%] [36.86%] [63.14%] 
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Table 4 Multiple Regressions of Long-Run Abnormal Returns   
 
This table reports regression results of long-run abnormal returns. The dependent variable is the three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) relative to control firms 
matched on size and book-to-market equity ratio. The explanatory variable of interest is the proxy for market efficiency, specifically, institutional ownership, hedge fund 
ownership, liquidity ratio, number of analysts following, and variance ratio. Other control variables include log(ME) (the natural logarithm of CPI-adjusted market 
capitalization as of the prior fiscal year end), B/M (book-to-market equity ratio, in which book value is measured at the fiscal year end prior to the event announcement and 
market value is measured at the month end before announcement), Cash/Assets (cash and marketable securities divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end), 
Debt/Assets (long-term debt divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end), EBITDA/Assets (EBITDA divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end), Prior 
return (stock return for the prior 12 months), Return volatility (standard deviation of daily returns in the prior 12 months), Post-CAPX/Assets (sum of capital expenditures for 
the three years subsequent to event announcement divided by total assets as of the prior fiscal year end), Proceeds/ME (announced repurchase/issuance transaction value 
scaled by market capitalization in the month end prior to event announcement), and industry (classified as Fama-French 49 industries) and year dummies. The associated t-
statistics are reported in parentheses below the estimated coefficients. Statistical significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
 
 Institutional ownership Hedge fund ownership Liquidity ratio Num. analysts following Variance ratio 
 Repo SEO Repo SEO Repo SEO Repo SEO Repo SEO 
Pricing efficiency proxy -0.128* 0.274*** -0.514*** 0.792*** -0.006** 0.039* -0.048** 0.032 -0.006** 0.010** 
 (-1.833) (2.667) (-2.682) (2.752) (-2.321) (1.816) (-1.971) (0.835) (-2.321) (2.294) 
Log(ME) -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 0.014 -0.002 0.009 0.007 0.010 -0.002 0.050** 
 (-0.250) (-0.121) (-0.785) (0.712) (-0.218) (0.444) (0.522) (0.465) (-0.218) (2.140) 
B/M -0.053 0.097 -0.042 0.093 -0.058 0.063 -0.062 0.083 -0.058 0.113 
 (-1.144) (1.161) (-0.950) (1.135) (-1.124) (0.749) (-1.344) (1.013) (-1.124) (1.041) 
Cash/Assets 0.007 -0.242 0.033 -0.245 0.033 -0.249 0.022 -0.282* 0.033 -0.413** 
 (0.046) (-1.527) (0.236) (-1.543) (0.208) (-1.605) (0.150) (-1.805) (0.208) (-2.299) 
Debt/Assets -0.005 0.038 -0.008 0.047 -0.035 0.069 -0.007 0.048 -0.035 -0.016 
 (-0.048) (0.301) (-0.069) (0.368) (-0.270) (0.532) (-0.059) (0.383) (-0.270) (-0.097) 
EBITDA/Assets -0.181 0.110 -0.281 0.099 -0.090 0.244** -0.197 0.152 -0.090 0.074 
 (-0.977) (1.113) (-1.557) (1.002) (-0.446) (2.420) (-1.058) (1.527) (-0.446) (0.661) 
Prior return -0.029 0.047*** -0.026 0.049*** -0.035 0.055*** -0.042 0.049*** -0.035 0.035* 
 (-0.684) (2.644) (-0.641) (2.797) (-0.762) (3.016) (-0.989) (2.845) (-0.762) (1.745) 
Return volatility 0.058 -0.207* 0.147 -0.259** 0.101 -0.252** 0.109 -0.187 0.101 -0.072 
 (0.542) (-1.712) (1.442) (-2.204) (0.888) (-2.108) (1.027) (-1.588) (0.888) (-0.539) 
Post-CAPX/Assets 1.004*** 0.334*** 1.006*** 0.334*** 0.950*** 0.325*** 1.023*** 0.319*** 0.950*** 0.352*** 
 (9.102) (5.274) (9.249) (5.294) (7.321) (4.846) (9.352) (5.132) (7.321) (4.329) 
Proceeds/ME 0.604** 0.032 0.609** -0.000 0.764** 0.108 0.571** 0.081 0.764** 0.231 
 (2.395) (0.210) (2.469) (-0.003) (2.450) (0.692) (2.277) (0.563) (2.450) (1.434) 
Intercept -0.851* -0.141 -0.849** -0.493 -0.504 -0.275 -0.956** -0.409 -0.504 -0.787** 
 (-1.939) (-0.350) (-1.986) (-1.263) (-1.140) (-0.781) (-2.132) (-1.114) (-1.140) (-2.035) 
N 9468 4121 9423 4102 7270 3919 9,531 4,238 7270 2513 
R-squared 0.035 0.046 0.038 0.047 0.034 0.050 0.035 0.043 0.034 0.061 
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Table 5 Earnings and Information Flow Manipulation Prior to the Events 
This table reports the industry-performance-adjusted abnormal accrual in the two quarters before the event 
(Panel A), and the three-day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) surrounding management voluntary 
earnings forecast (Panel B), respectively for events in the early and later periods. The estimation of abnormal 
accruals follows Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). In particular, for each calendar quarter and two-digit SIC-code 
industry, we estimate the following model using all Compustat firms with data available:     ∑          
 
   
                                    . TA is total accruals, measured as               
        , where     is change in current assets,     is change in current liabilities,       is change in 
cash and marketable securities,      is change in debt in current liabilities, and     is depreciation and 
amortization expense.    is a dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal quarter j and 0 otherwise;        is the 
quarterly change in sales; PPE is property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter; LTA is the lag 
of total accruals; Assets is total assets at the beginning of the quarter; and   is the regression residual. All the 
variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the quarter. The top and bottom one percent of the deflated 
variables are deleted to mitigate the effects of outliers and data errors. Moreover, we adjust the estimated 
abnormal accruals (i.e., the regression residuals) for performance. Specifically, the performance-matched 
abnormal accruals for a sample firm are the firm-specific abnormal accruals minus the median abnormal accruals 
of the portfolio matched on industry and the prior ROA. The test of information flow manipulation follows 
Brockman, Khurana, and Martin (2008), proxied by management voluntary forecast of earnings in the month 
prior to the event announcement. The three-day CAR is used to measure if the forecast is good or bad news and 
how good/bad it is. Prop of good news is the proportion of forecasts with positive CARs. Earning forecast data 
are obtained from First Call. We test the significance of means and the difference in means by t-test, the 
significance of medians by Wilcoxon signed rank test and the significance of difference in medians by Kruskal-
Wallis test. Statistical significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to significance levels of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Earnings management 
 Early sample Later sample Difference 
(Later – Early) 
Repurchases 
N 5812 2504  
Mean -0.373%*** -0.023% 0.350%*** 
Median -0.235%*** -0.012% 0.223%*** 
SEOs 
N 3694 1265  
Mean 1.399%*** -0.896%*** -2.295%*** 
Median 0.756%*** -0.002% -0.758%*** 
 
Panel B: Information flow manipulation (Market reaction to management voluntary forecast of earnings) 
 Early sample Later sample Difference 
(Later – Early) 
Repurchases 
N 143 504  
Prop of good news 0.329 0.401 0.072*** 
Mean CAR -0.073*** -0.033*** 0.040*** 
Median CAR -0.027*** -0.017*** 0.010** 
SEOs 
N 26 112  
Prop of good news 0.558 0.571 0.013 
Mean CAR 0.019 0.007 -0.012* 
Median CAR 0.009 0.006 -0.003 
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Table 6 Market-Timing Characteristics of Repurchase and SEO Firms 
 
This table presents the mean and median (in the square brackets) market-timing characteristics of event firms 
prior to the announcements. B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity in the prior fiscal year to market 
capitalization in the month before the event announcement. Prior return is the buy-and-hold return in the 12 
months prior to the event announcement. ME is the CPI-adjusted market capitalization in the month before the 
announcement. Log(M/V), the log difference between the observed market value and the intrinsic value of 
equity, is estimated as in Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). RD/A is the ratio of research and 
development expenses to total assets in the fiscal year before the announcement. We adjust event firm B/M, 
log(ME), and RD/A by subtracting the contemporaneous industry median, and adjust the prior 12-month return 
by subtracting the contemporaneous buy-and-hold value-weighted industry portfolio return, where industries are 
classified into 49 categories as in Fama and French (1997). The change in analyst investment recommendation is 
constructed as the change of the average I/B/E/S standard score (1 for strong buy, 2 for buy, 3 for hold, 4 for 
underperform, and 5 for sell) from 12th month before to the month before the event announcement. Insider net 
sales are insider sales minus purchases during the 12 month prior to the announcement denominated by shares 
outstanding, which is adjusted by the average net sales from 48 month before to 13 month before the 
announcement. Freq. of secondary offerings is the proportion of SEO firms that offer both primary and 
secondary shares. Size of secondary offerings is the fraction of secondary shares in the total offering shares. The 
last column reports the difference in variables between the later and early samples. We test the significance of 
means and the mean differences by t-test, the significance of medians by Wilcoxon signed rank test and the 
significance of difference in medians by Kruskal-Wallis test. Differences in proportions are tested by Z-test. 
Statistical significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, refers to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 Early sample Later sample Difference 
(Later – Early) 
Repurchases 
B/M 
 
0.137*** 
[0.042***] 
0.063** 
[-0.010*] 
-0.074*** 
[-0.052***] 
Prior return 
 
-0.102*** 
[-0.133***] 
-0.003 
[-0.017*] 
0.099*** 
[0.116***] 
Log(ME) 
 
1.091*** 
[0.877***] 
1.098*** 
[1.008***] 
0.007 
[0.131] 
Log (M/V) 0.016 
[0.015] 
0.141*** 
[0.118***] 
0.126*** 
[0.103***] 
RD/A 
 
-0.002** 
[-0.000**] 
-0.006*** 
[-0.000***] 
-0.004* 
[0.000] 
Change in analyst 
recommendation  
0.097*** 
[0.001***] 
0.009 
[0.000] 
-0.088*** 
[-0.001***] 
SEOs 
B/M 
 
-0.161*** 
[-0.184***] 
-0.047** 
[-0.113***] 
0.114*** 
[0.071***] 
Prior return 
 
0.783*** 
[0.420***] 
0.530*** 
[0.213***] 
-0.253*** 
[-0.207***] 
Log(ME) 
 
0.895*** 
[0.896***] 
-0.037 
[0.000] 
-0.932*** 
[-0.896***] 
Log (M/V) 0.659*** 
[0.593***] 
0.484*** 
[0.439***] 
-0.176*** 
[-0.154***] 
RD/A 
 
0.058*** 
[0.000***] 
0.142*** 
[0.049***] 
0.084*** 
[0.049***] 
Change in analyst 
recommendation  
-0.110*** 
[-0.030***] 
-0.038** 
[0.000] 
0.072*** 
[0.030***] 
Insider net sales 
 
0.083*** 
[0.033***] 
0.008 
[-0.001] 
-0.075* 
[-0.034***] 
Freq. of secondary offerings 0.363 0.157 -0.206*** 
Size of secondary offerings 0.121 0.073 -0.048*** 
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Table 7 Firm Characteristics of Repurchase Firms 
This table reports the mean and median (in the square brackets) repurchase firm characteristics in the early and 
later samples, respectively. The last column reports the difference in characteristics from the early to the later 
samples. The proportion of repurchase in payout is measured both by firm number and by dollar value. By firm 
number it is the proportion of repurchase firms in the total number of firms that have positive payout. By dollar 
value it is the proportion of dollar amount used for repurchases in the total dollar amount that is paid out. 
Repurchase frequency is the fraction of years during the past five years in which the repurchase firm announced 
other repurchases. Completion rate is the ratio of the actual dollar spent in repurchases in two years following the 
announcement to the announced repurchase program size. Cash flow volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of cash flows (denominated by total assets) during the past five years. Non-operating income is 
denominated by total assets in the prior fiscal year. Interest coverage ratio is cash flow divided by interest 
expense. We test the significance of the difference in means by t-test and the significance of the difference in 
medians by Wilcoxon Kruskal-Wallis test. Differences in proportions are tested by Z-test. Statistical 
significance, denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Early sample Later sample Difference 
(Later – Early) 
Proportion of repurchase in 
payout (firm number) 
0.563 0.723 0.160*** 
Proportion of repurchase in 
payout (dollar value) 
0.421 
 
0.606 
 
0.185*** 
 
Repurchase frequency 0.311 0.525 0.214*** 
 [0.200] [0.600] [0.400***] 
Completion rate 0.548 0.756 0.208*** 
 [0.617] [1.000] [0.383***] 
Cash flow volatility 1.482 0.718 -0.764*** 
 [0.038] [0.030] [-0.008**] 
Non-operating income 0.011 0.006 -0.005*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [-0.003***] 
Interest coverage ratio 59.447 97.212 37.765*** 
 [9.684] [13.822] [4.138***] 
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Table 8 The Operating Performance of SEO firms 
The table reports the annual median operating performance of SEO firms from three years before the offering to 
three years after the offering, respectively for the early sample (Panel A) and the later sample (Panel B). 
OIBDP/A is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, ROA is the ratio of net income to 
assets (ROA), OIBDP/Sales is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to sales, Profit margin is the 
ratio of net income to sales, Cash/A is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to assets, CAPX/A is the ratio 
of capital expenditure to assets, and log(A) is the log of CPI-adjusted total assets. The last row of each panel 
reports the difference in variables between the third year after the offering and the year immediately prior to the 
offering. We test the significance of the difference in medians by Kruskal-Wallis test. Statistical significance, 
denoted by *, **, and ***, corresponds to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Panel A: Early Sample 
Fiscal year relative 
to the event OIBDP/A ROA 
OIBDP/ 
Sales 
Profit 
Margin Cash/A CAPX/A log(A) 
-3 0.138 0.040 0.1029 0.029 0.066 0.069 4.612 
-2 0.139 0.041 0.1057 0.031 0.074 0.071 4.572 
-1 0.147 0.045 0.1119 0.034 0.074 0.073 4.791 
0 0.147 0.049 0.1205 0.039 0.154 0.072 5.410 
1 0.122 0.033 0.1071 0.027 0.098 0.069 5.604 
2 0.109 0.020 0.0968 0.017 0.082 0.056 5.717 
3 0.106 0.018 0.0963 0.014 0.077 0.048 5.837 
Diff(3, -1) -0.041*** -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 0.003* -0.025*** 1.046*** 
         
Panel B: Later Sample 
Fiscal year relative 
to the event OIBDP/A ROA 
 
OIBDP/ 
Sales 
Profit 
Margin Cash/A CAPX/A log(A) 
-3 -0.038 -0.123 0.0138 -0.117 0.257 0.030 4.926 
-2 -0.021 -0.106 0.0178 -0.108 0.249 0.028 4.991 
-1 -0.002 -0.108 0.0300 -0.100 0.245 0.028 5.076 
0 0.029 -0.069 0.0476 -0.055 0.303 0.025 5.492 
1 0.033 -0.054 0.0513 -0.047 0.271 0.025 5.633 
2 0.051 -0.036 0.0580 -0.031 0.220 0.027 5.852 
3 0.061 -0.026 0.0742 -0.024 0.197 0.028 5.994 
Diff(3, -1) 0.063*** 0.082*** 0.044*** 0.076*** -0.047* 0.000 0.918*** 
 
